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SHEILA LINTOTT

Superiority in Humor Theory

abstract
In this article, I consider the standard interpretation of the superiority theory of humor attributed to Plato, Aristotle, and
Hobbes, according to which the theory allegedly places feelings of superiority at the center of humor and comic amusement.
The view that feelings of superiority are at the heart of all comic amusement is wildly implausible. Therefore textual evidence
for the interpretation of Plato, Aristotle, or Hobbes as offering the superiority theory as an essentialist theory of humor is
worth careful consideration. Through textual analysis I argue that not one of these three philosophers defends an essentialist
theory of comic amusement. I also discuss the way various theories of humor relate to one another and the proper place of a
superiority theory in humor theory in light of my analysis.

i. introduction

There are, it is said, three traditional theories of
humor: the superiority theory, the incongruity theory, and the relief theory. However, as some have
pointed out, the theories are not true rivals because they are not theories of the same thing
(Zamir 2014; Shaw 2010; Smuts 2006; Levinson
1998). As Jerrold Levinson observes, superiority
and relief theories “seem more concerned with
the concomitants or mechanisms of the humorous
reaction than with its conceptual core. Thus, these
competitors of incongruity theory are currently
seen as even less able to provide an adequate answer to the basic question” (Levinson 1998, 564).
The incongruity theory purports to define the formal object of comic amusement, which it locates
in certain kinds of incongruity. The superiority
theory is concerned with the affective response
that often accompanies comic amusement, which
it maintains is an enjoyable feeling of superiority to the object of amusement. Finally, the relief
theory focuses on the expression of comic amusement in laughter, which it considers a welcome
release of pent up tension and energy. We might
say that the incongruity theory focuses on the cognitive aspects, superiority the emotive, and relief
the physical of comic amusement. So, just as my

heart quickens (physical) and I am fearful (emotive) when I judge (cognitive) a car is about to hit
me, it is likely that the experience of comic amusement often includes some or all of these aspects.
Perhaps a disjunctive account, according to which
humor aims to satisfy one or more human interest,
as Tzachi Zamir (2014) suggests, offers the most
comprehensive way of capturing the nature and
value of comic amusement.
Some presentations of the superiority theory
are more measured than others. David Monro
says, “According to any superiority theory of humor, the laugher always looks down on whatever
he laughs at, and so judges it inferior by some
standard” (1988, 349). Others give the theory a
more limited and more reasonable scope. For example, Eva Dadlez states: “Superiority theories
ally humor principally with ridicule and the enjoyment of one’s own superiority in pinpointing
the foibles or weaknesses of another” (2011, 2).
In her discussion of offensive humor, Jeannette
Bicknell explains: “There is an element of malice
in much humor. (That slipping on a banana peel
is funny does not make the fall any less painful,
after all.) A good deal of our laughter in comedy
is directed at misfortune, presented in such a way
as to elicit amusement rather than outrage, tears
or compassion” (2007, 458).
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As these latter construals suggest, the superiority theory is not best understood as a stand-alone
theory, but better as a way of describing a sort of
comic amusement we may have to a certain kind
of humor. Rather than defining humor per se, the
superiority theory explains the nature and value
of some humor, allows us to distinguish among
the experiences of different kinds of humor, and
articulates some issues and debates concerning
the ethics and etiquette of some humor. But despite how obvious the proper role of the superiority theory is upon contemplation, the theory is
often presented as a stand-alone, comprehensive
theory of humor. A counterargument or multiple
counterexamples then follow; set it up and knock
it down. For the sake of clarity, in the following,
I lay bare the myth of the superiority theory as
an essentialist theory of humor by which I mean a
stand-alone theory that aims to articulate the necessary and sufficient conditions of comic amusement at the humorous. Undoubtedly, some readers are already convinced an essentialist version
of the superiority theory of humor is unacceptable and some are likely skeptical of claims that
the likes of Plato, Aristotle, and Hobbes thought
it acceptable. However, it may not be obvious to
everyone that an essentialist or similarly strong
version of a superiority theory of humor is implausible. Roger Scruton, for example, currently
defends a version of a superiority theory of comic
amusement as “attentive demolition” (1987, 169).
Furthermore, given the frequency with which the
theory is presented as essentialist and attributed
to Plato, Aristotle, and Hobbes, it is worth considering the textual evidence for an essentialist
interpretation of the superiority theory.
My plan for the remainder of this essay is as
follows. In Section II, I survey some presentations of the superiority theory of humor as it is
traditionally construed. I then argue, too easily
as we shall see, that construed as such, the theory is wildly implausible. In Sections III, IV, and
V, I consider the relevant texts of Plato, Aristotle, and Hobbes, showing that each is misinterpreted when said to defend an essentialist version of the superiority theory. In the cases of
Plato and Aristotle, I show definitively that neither held such a view; in the case of Hobbes,
I raise serious skepticism about how to interpret his comments on laughter and comic amusement. Given the implausibility of the superiority theory as a theory of all and only humor,
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in Section VI I discuss the contributions a nonessentialist version of it can make within humor
theory.

ii. superiority theory: the standard account

Typically, the superiority theory is cast as an attempt to account for all cases of humor. For example, Adrian Bardon says “The superiority theory is
the theory that the humor we find in comedy and
in life is based on ridicule, wherein we regard the
object of amusement as inferior and/or ourselves
as superior” (2005, 463). Although she admits that
many so-called theories of humor are “actually descriptions of conditions under which humor may
be experienced rather than attempts to explain
humor,” Patricia Keith-Spiegel puts it like this:
“According to the principle of superiority, mockery, ridicule, and laughter at the foolish actions
of others are central to the humor experience”
(1972, 5–6). In other words, the superiority theory
maintains that ridicule and feelings of relative superiority are essential components of humor. This
theory is standardly attributed to Plato, Aristotle, and Hobbes, and Hobbes’s thoughts on laughter are considered its paradigmatic articulation.
John Morreall, the prolific philosopher of laughter and humor, construes the superiority theory in
this same way: “The oldest, and probably still the
most widespread theory of laughter is that laughter is an expression of a person’s feelings of superiority over other people. This theory goes back at
least as far as Plato and Aristotle, and was given
its classic statement in Hobbes” (1982, 243–244).
Morreall admits that the superiority theory can
account also for self-deprecating humor, as when
he characterizes the superiority theory as a theory
of laughter: “psychological theory articulating the
view of laughter that started in Plato and the Bible
and dominated Western thinking about laughter
for two millennia. . . . Simply put, our laughter expresses feelings of superiority over other people
or over a former state of ourselves” (2013).
But, understood this way, is the theory even remotely plausible? Is it plausible to believe that all
laughter is derisive? In the introductory philosophy course I teach on the philosophy of laughter, it takes students about ten seconds to amass
numerous counterexamples to the superiority
theory, such as laughing at a pun, laughing with
joy at another’s accomplishment, laughing at an
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innocent joke, laughing with a person who makes
a witty remark, laughing at an incongruity, laughing in surprise, and laughing out of nervousness.
Some of these counterexamples might miss their
mark if the superiority theory is meant to capture only cases of humorous laughter, but this is
surely a mistaken concession. In any case, most
of the alleged counterexamples, such as laughing
with a witty person or at an innocent joke, are
clearly legitimate counterexamples to the superiority theory as a comprehensive theory of humorous laughter. The theory then cannot account
for the distinction we make every day between
laughing at and laughing with others. As an essentialist theory of humor, the superiority theory fails
terribly.
It is strange, then, that thinkers as astute students of human nature and human life such as
Plato, Aristotle, and Hobbes apparently held such
an obviously flawed and extreme theory. However, it is not the theory that is at fault; rather,
it is the commentators who have offered hasty
and overly simplistic caricatures instead of charitable and careful interpretations of the works
concerned. As Aaron Smuts points out, “Neither
Plato nor Aristotle makes clear pronouncements
about the essence of humor, though their comments are preoccupied with the role of feelings
of superiority in our finding something funny”
(Smuts 2006). I agree with Smuts that neither
Plato nor Aristotle, and I will add Hobbes, espoused superiority theory as an essentialist comprehensive theory of humorous laughter.
In the next three sections, I show that not one
of the three can be said to hold or defend a superiority theory of laughter if such a theory is taken
to claim that superiority is either necessary or sufficient for laughter, let alone if it is taken to claim
that superiority is both necessary and sufficient
for laughter. The textual evidence, when considered in context, shows that at most each can be
said to hold only that superiority explains some
humor. Reading anything stronger into their theories is an error. I proceed here chronologically,
beginning with a consideration of Plato’s, then
Aristotle’s, and finally Hobbes’s thoughts on humor. Hobbes, as we will see, is the most difficult
case for my thesis, which is that the superiority
theory is not best understood as a theory of humor but rather as a tool for understanding one
particular kind of humor and its social, ethical,
and aesthetic implications.
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iii. plato on humor and laughter

Plato discusses humor and laughter in several
places, most extensively in a short section of the
Philebus, but also in the Republic, and he mentions laughter in passing in a several works including the Symposium and Lysis. In addition, in the
Euthydemus, Plato notably employs much humor.
Plato’s theory of humor is taken primarily from
his Philebus, as the linguist Salvatore Attardo
states:
The passages that concern humor (48c/50a) are taken
from a review of various emotions like anger, pity, etc.
Plato puts humor in the field of the “ridiculous.” Whoever does not follow the Delphic Oracle’s admonition
“Know thyself,” or in other words, lacks self-knowledge,
is defined as ridiculous. Without doubt, the ridiculous is
seen by Plato as belonging to the category of πονηρία
(perversion, evil). (1994, 19)

Plato’s Philebus is a difficult dialogue about the
nature of pleasure and whether the best life is one
of intellectualism or hedonism. In it, Plato uses
the pleasure of laughter, specifically laughter at
the ridiculous, to illustrate how some pleasures
are tainted with pain. Laughter at the ridiculous,
he claims, is tainted with the pain associated with
the disharmony malice wreaks on the soul. When
we laugh at a ridiculous character portrayed in
comedy, Plato contends, we are laughing at that
person’s self-ignorance. Self-ignorance, for Plato,
is an evil; it is a serious vice, as Socrates tells
Protarchus. Obviously, given the importance he
affords self-knowledge, Plato does not take this
matter lightly.
Although in the Philebus the focus of the discussion is initially on comedy, the scope of Plato’s
concern expands to encompass laughter at friends,
and so Socrates concludes:
Our argument leads to the conclusion that if we laugh at
what is ridiculous about our friends, by mixing pleasure
with malice, we thereby mix pleasure with pain. For we
had agreed earlier that malice is a pain in the soul, that
laughing is a pleasure, and that both occur together on
those occasions. (1993, 50e13–16)

This passage is often referred to in discussion of
Plato’s theory of humor and laughter. In The Philosophy of Laughter and Humor, Morreall sums
up Plato’s ideas:
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What we laugh at, in Plato’s view, is vice, particularly selfignorance, in people who are relatively powerless. Our
amusement is a kind of malice toward such people, he
thought, and this should make us wary of amusement,
but so should the fact that amusement is an emotion
in which we tend to lose rational control of ourselves.
(1987, 10)

Noël Carroll claims “for Plato, amusement contains an element of malice” (2014, 6; see also 2003).
Simon Critchley tells how Plato’s view that enjoying humor entails viciousness led him to forbid laughter “to the virtuous guardians of Plato’s
imagined philosophical city” and “dominates the
philosophical tradition until the eighteenth century” (2002, 3). Bardon says:
[Plato] explains that the object of laughter in comedy is
the “ridiculous.” The ridiculous, more specifically, is the
self-ignorance of others when they falsely believe that
they possess wisdom. In other words, laughter results
from a feeling of pleasure at seeing others suffer the
misfortune of being deluded about their own wisdom.
Socrates argues, however, that the soul experiences both
“pleasure and pain” when amused by the ridiculous portrayed in comedy: one can feel pleasure and laugh when
presented by such fools in comedy, but to feel pleasure
at others’ misfortunes is to feel malice, which he considers a “pain of the soul.” The laughter and pleasure, then,
that we experience when enjoying comedy is mixed with
malice and pain. (2005, 463)

Despite the commonness of this interpretation,
interpreting Plato as equating laughter with malice is a mistake. First of all, Plato cannot believe
superiority is sufficient for laughter because he
contrasts the ridiculous and the odious or hateful
on the grounds that while both are judged flawed
for their self-ignorance, the ridiculous is relatively
weak, and the hateful is relatively strong.
For ignorance on the side of the strong and powerful is
odious and ugly; it is hurtful even for their neighbors,
both the ignorance itself and its imitations, whatever
they may be. Ignorance on the side of the weak, by contrast, deserves to be placed among the ridiculous in rank
and nature. (1993 49c)

Thus, our hatred of self-ignorant yet powerful
people involves a feeling of superiority due to
their self-ignorance, but, due to their strength and
perhaps their related capacity to harm through
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ignorance or retaliate against mockery, it does not
provoke laughter. Moreover, although perhaps
not consistent with all of his philosophical views,
and perhaps in a case of Socratic irony, Plato appears to reserve malicious laughter for our friends
when he denies “any injustice or malice” when we
“rejoice about evils that happen to your friends”
(1993 49d).
But does Plato even think superiority is necessary for laughter? He never directly says that we
laugh only at the ridiculous, although he does admit that we sometimes do. Admittedly, the Greek
work for ‘ridiculous’ is understood in terms of
something being laughable, so all ridiculous things
are laughable, but are all laughable things ridiculous? In his analysis, Mitchell Miller suggests that
Plato’s discussion of laughter in the Philebus does
not amount to a wholesale moral condemnation
of laughter:
Should we be disturbed that Socrates identifies ψθόνος
[the feeling of malice] at the heart of this pleasure? If we
focus on his purpose in surveying various pleasures, not
at all. He is at work collecting all the kinds of pleasure
in preparation for the later task of selecting some of
them as ingredients in the good life. He is doing a nonjudgmental phenomenology, and it is appropriate that he
acknowledge pleasure wherever he finds it; the moralcritical work of separating the ethically good pleasures
from the ethically bad ones will come later. (2008, 268)

All that can be inferred from the Philebus argument regarding laughter is that laughing at the
ridiculous is malicious and is thus explicable in
terms of superiority. This leaves open the possibility that sometimes we laugh without maliciousness
or feelings of superiority.
Moreover, Plato does appear to think that
some laughter, laughter at enemies, may not be
malicious:
Socrates: Now, if you rejoice about evils that happen
to your enemy, is there any injustice or malice in your
pleasure?
Protarchus: How should there be?
Socrates: But is there any occasion when it is not unjust to be pleased rather than pained to see bad things
happen to your friends?
Protarchus: Clearly not.
Socrates: But we just agreed that ignorance is bad for
everyone?
Protarchus: Right. (1993 49d)
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When we laugh at our enemies’ ignorance, then,
it is not malicious. The pleasure of such laughter
it seems is mixed with pain according to Plato,
seemingly because it is appropriate, rather than
malicious, to enjoy bad things happening to one’s
enemies. Although the Socrates of the Philebus
generally seems “devoid of any touch of Socratic
irony,” this may be a bit of Socratic irony that goes
undeveloped (Jowett 1871, 130). However, even if
so, it, in fact, is an instance of nonmalicious humor.
Is there room in Plato’s theory for nonmalicious
or nonridiculing laughter? Nothing he says in the
Philebus rules out this possibility, but is there textual evidence for it here or elsewhere? Is there
evidence, for example, that Plato is aware of the
difference between laughing with and laughing at.
The superiority theory is usually interpreted as
leaving no room for laughing with. It reduces all
laughter, including apparent instances of laughing
with, to laughing at.
Plato is aware of the distinction between laughing at and laughing with as is evidenced in
Aristophanes’s post-hiccupping speech in the
Symposium.
You are quite right, said Aristophanes, laughing. I will
unsay my words; but do you please not to watch me, as I
fear that in the speech which I am about to make, instead
of others laughing with me, which is to the manner born
of our muse and would be all the better, I shall only be
laughed at by them. (1892c, 189b, my emphasis)

The distinction drawn is between γ έλοιος,
which means mirth provoking or amusing, and
καταγ έλαστος, meaning ridiculous or inviting
ridicule.1
We also see the notion of the amusing in the
beginning of Book V of the Republic. Socrates
admits to Glaucon that he sometimes enjoys what
he calls “innocent laughter”:
That, I replied, is a sorry consolation; I shall destroy my
friends as well as myself. Not that I mind a little innocent
laughter; but he who kills the truth is a murderer. (1892b,
V, 451a, emphasis added)

Finally, in the Lysis, Plato depicts the friends
laughing together, not at each other, but with each
other:
That is a matter of dispute between us, he said.
And which is the nobler? Is that also a matter of dispute?
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Yes, certainly.
And another disputed point is, which is the fairer?
The two boys laughed. (1892a, 207c2–6)

Obviously, Plato is aware that not all humor involves the ridiculous and not all laughter at the
humorous is malicious.
Just as Plato’s inquiry into poetry leads him to
conclude that the vast majority of poetry should be
banned from the ideal city-state, likewise his considerations of laughter take aim at a problematic
kind of laughter: ridicule. In the Philebus, Plato
discusses laughing in ridicule as a case of mixed
pleasure, which does not entail that all laughing is
ridiculing. Stephen Halliwell makes the case that
Plato’s conceptions of humor and comic amusement are complex and cannot be properly understood from the Philebus alone: “For example, the
connection between laughter and phthonos in the
Philebus does not recur in any other Platonic text.
. . . There is no contradiction here but a concentration on different aspects of comedy/laughter in
different contexts” (Halliwell 2008, 301). Regarding art, Plato’s attention, we are well aware, is
frequently drawn to the most ethically and epistemologically suspect. When he discusses laughter
and comedy, he sometimes focuses on the ways
comedy and laughter can provide guilty pleasures
or distance us from one another. Yet, it is a mistake
to conclude that he saw all laughter this way.

iv. aristotle on humor and laughter

Defending Aristotle from the claim that his theory
of laughter insists superiority is necessary or sufficient for laughter is a relatively easy task. Aristotle
discusses laughter in the Nicomachean Ethics, the
Rhetoric, and in his Poetics.
Most commentators, from Francis Hutcheson to John Morreall, mention in passing that
Aristotle’s discussions of laughter include elements of incongruity. For instance, in the Rhetoric,
he discusses the pleasure of apprehending incongruity and the skill at presenting it in a humorous
manner:
And the greatest number of elegant effects are the result
of metaphor combined with misdirection. For it becomes
more evident in what respect one learns something when
it goes against a disposition toward the opposite, and the
soul seems to say “How true, and yet I missed it.” In the
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case of quips, the elegant ones result from not meaning
what one is saying. . . . And well-made riddles are pleasing for the same reason, for learning and metaphor are
involved, and what Theodorus calls speaking in innovative ways. This happens when something is paradoxical
and not, as he puts it, “by our prior” opinion, but like the
turns of phrase in things that make us laugh (which jokes
are capable of doing even by a turn in a letter, since it
surprises us) and in poetic verses. (2009, 1412a19–30)
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to be a harmonious way of associating with people—
sorts of things that one ought to say, and a way of saying
them, and likewise a way of taking what is said. (2002,
1127b35–1128a3)

Morreall suggests that Aristotle does not fully pursue the question of how incongruity factors into
laughter because by the time it occurred to him in
the Rhetoric, he already committed himself to a
superiority theory in Nicomachean Ethics and Poetics: “The incongruity theory was first hinted at
by Aristotle; though because it did not fit neatly in
with the superiority theory of his Poetics and Nicomachean Ethics, he never developed it” (Morreall
1983, 16).
The Poetics may give us the most insight into
Aristotle’s theory of humor. The text as we have
it is more informative about tragedy and epic poetry than it is about comedy. Whether Aristotle
never wrote a treatise on comedy or he did and
it is lost to us, we can lament the fact that we do
not have access to his full thoughts on the matter. What we do have access to in Book I of the
Poetics does not support an essentialist interpretation of Aristotle’s discussion of superiority in
comic amusement, although it also does not rule
out such an interpretation.
But there is evidence that Aristotle was not offering a superiority theory as an essentialist theory
of humor in the Nicomachean Ethics, given that
in it he discusses the mean between the vicious
extremes of laughter. In Book IV of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle does describe a form
of laughter that distinctively involves ridicule and
derision, that of the vulgar buffoon: “Now those
who go to excess in making people laugh seem to
be crude buffoons, greedily eager to do anything
for a laugh, and aiming at causing laughter rather
than at speaking gracefully without causing pain
to the one who is made fun of” (2002, 1128a4–7).
Immediately prior to this remark, however,
Aristotle also points out that not all laughter is
of this sort and explicitly describes how the pleasure of laughter can be harmoniously enjoyed:

Aristotle reiterates the idea that not all laughter is
derisive again when characterizing the charming
or virtuous way to amuse: “Those who are playful in a harmonious way are called charming, as
being readily flexible, for such acts seem to be
motions that come from one’s character” (2002,
1128a9–11).
The tasteful person will amuse and be amused
without bringing pain or disharmony. This person
has scruples and knows when, and about what, not
to joke: “Someone with a gracious and generous
spirit will hold himself to such limits, being like
a law to himself” (2002, 1128a33). If, therefore,
Aristotle’s theory includes recognition of the role
of incongruity in laughter and of the rhetorical
skills needed to employ it harmoniously, then he
cannot be said to hold that superiority is either
necessary or sufficient for humorous laugher.
Finally, it is worth briefly considering the mysterious text called the Tractatus Coislinianus, usually
associated with Aristotle, although in different
ways by different scholars. Richard Janko (1987)
argues it is notes on Aristotle’s (believed by most
to be) lost writing on comedy. Lane Cooper maintains “the most natural explanation is that the
Poetics once included an explicit inquiry into the
sources of comic effect—something analogous to,
or possibly in essentials identical with, the analysis
of the sources of laughter in the Tractatus Coislinianus” (1922, 8).
Whether it is a work of Aristotle’s or in some
way related to it, the Tractatus is clearly influenced
by Aristotlean theory. So, it is not without interest
that in it, three possible sorts of comic characters are listed: “The characters [ethe] of comedy
are (1) the buffoonish, (2) the ironical, and (3)
those of the imposters” (Cooper 1922, 226). To my
mind, none of these sorts of characters requires
a feeling of superiority to evoke comic amusement. The buffoonish is the most likely candidate
for derision, yet are all buffoonish people thereby
judged inferior? Consider, for example, Robert
Solomon’s discussion of the Three Stooges, buffoonishness if ever there were any.

But since in life there is also relaxation, and in this there
is a playful way of passing the time, here too there seems

No one, to my knowledge, has advocated what we might
call the inferiority theory of humor, laughter as the great
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leveler, beyond contempt or indignation, antithetical
to pretention and pomp. Sitting on the sofa watching
Malice in the Palace for the twenty-seventh time, we
allow ourselves to fall into a world of miniature mayhem in which we feel as foolish as they are. (Solomon
1992, 146)

We may or may not believe that all buffoonery can
evoke comic amusement involving feelings of inferiority or self-censure. But we can, perhaps, admit
with Solomon that comic characters, even when
acting fools or confessing their faults, as many
stand-up comedians make careers of, can make
us feel likewise implicated or even inferior rather
than superior.2
Moreover, the Tractatus Coislinianus does not
isolate buffoonery as the whole of comedy. Characters who are ironical or imposters, perhaps exemplified today in the political humor of Jon Stewart in The Daily Show or Stephen Colbert in The
Colbert Report and in comic impersonations such
as Tina Fey’s impersonation of Sarah Palin on Saturday Night Live or Dave Chappelle’s of Prince
on Chappelle’s Show, need not, although in some
cases they may, make anyone feel superior to the
performer or to the target(s) of the humor.3

v. hobbes on humor and laughter

Hobbes is the philosopher most wholly and confidently associated with the standard version of
the superiority theory. And for good reason, given
that most of what he says about laughter (and
much else!) is pretty negative. Michael Billig explains, “Hobbes puts ridicule at the centre of
humour and thereby questions the goodness of
laughter. He is telling us to look behind the smiles
and the jests. If we do so, then we will see something not too pleasant” (2005, 52).
Yet, to interpret Hobbes’s remarks about laughter as articulating an essentialist superiority theory of humorous laughter is, in the first place,
uncharitable. Although his thoughts on laughter
are often said to amount to a theory of laughter,
this interpretation is derived from his explicit contemplation on laughter limited to two brief reflections in the Leviathan and Human Nature, about
550 words in total (1839b, IX, 13; 1839a, VI). When
Hobbes discusses laughter it is in the context of
exploring and illustrating the passions in light of
his overall picture of human beings as basically
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competitive, self-interested creatures and his related views on the justified and necessary system
of government.
The passage most frequently cited in the context of presenting Hobbes’s so-called theory of
laughter comes from Human Nature when he asserts that: “the passion of laughter is nothing else
but a sudden glory arising from sudden conception of some eminency in ourselves, by comparison with the infirmities of others, or with our own
formerly” (1839b, IX, 13). With attention to the
phrase “nothing else but,” it seems reasonable
to interpret this as a claim that laughter can be
wholly identified with the feeling of superiority. In
other words, and according to the most common
interpretation of Hobbes on laughter, he holds a
strong essentialist version of the superiority theory according to which feeling superior is always
necessary and sufficient for laughter.
However, is Hobbes really committed to the
view that superiority is necessary and sufficient
for laughter? Francis Hutcheson, for one, reads
Hobbes this way: “If Mr. Hobbes’s notion be just,
then, first, there can be no laughter on any occasion . . . where we do not observe some superiority to ourselves above some other thing: and again,
it must follow, that every sudden appearance of superiority over another must excite laughter when
we attend to it” (Hutcheson 1750, 7). There are
times when it seems that Hobbes is presenting the
sort of theory Hutcheson attributes to him, again,
such as when he tells us that laughter is “nothing
else but a sudden glory arising from sudden conception of some eminency in ourselves” (1839b,
IX, 13, emphasis altered). However, when considered in the context of everything Hobbes says
about laughter, his statement that laughter is nothing but an expression of superiority stands out as
hyperbole.
Maybe Hobbes does believe that literally any
feeling of superiority is sufficient for laughter and
comic amusement. After all, he denies wit is necessary for laughter when he asserts that laughter is
often aroused in absence of wit: “laughter, which is
always joy. . . . That it consisteth in wit, or, as they
call it, in the jest, this experience confuteth; for
men laugh at mischances and indecencies, wherein
there lieth no wit or jest at all” (Human Nature,
IX, 13). In other words, Hobbes denies wit or jest
is always present in that which evokes our laughter
and thereby maintains that feelings of superiority
alone can be sufficient for laughter.
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However, not only does he deny wit is enough,
he also denies superiority alone will suffice, insisting that novelty is also needed. For example, when
he elaborates on the joy that laughter is an expression of, he insists its cause must be surprising and
incongruous: “And forasmuch as the same thing is
no more ridiculous when it groweth stale or usual,
whatsoever it be that moveth laughter, it must
be new and unexpected” (1839b,IX, 13). “Must be
new and unexpected”; in other words, superiority
is not sufficient for laughter given that, in the absence of novelty and incongruity, superiority will
not evoke laughter. Thus, Hobbes believes there
is more to laughter than superiority and appears
to hold a theory of laughter that places novelty
and incongruity in a central position. Hence, just
as it is wrong to conclude that incongruity, even
novel incongruity, is always sufficient for laughter according to Hobbes, it is likewise wrong to
conclude he maintains that superiority is always
sufficient.
If not sufficient, perhaps Hobbes thinks superiority is necessary for laughter? Admittedly
he does speak of derisive laughter, as when he
mentions the disposition to laugh when another
falls, “to see another fall, is disposition to laugh”
(1839b, IX, 21) or the dishonor of mocking, “to revile, mock, or pity, is to dishonor” (1839a, X, 25).
However, if Hobbes makes the distinction we find
in Plato between laughing at and laughing with,
we have reason to question whether he makes a
claim to necessity as well. Hobbes does distinguish
between cases of ridicule and something akin to
shared amusement, as we see when he explains
why men hate being laughed at and opens the
possibility of laughing in an unridiculing manner,
“where all the company may laugh together”: “It is
no wonder, therefore, that men take it heinously to
be laughed at or derided, that is, triumphed over.
Laughter without offence, must be at absurdities
and infirmities abstracted from persons, and where
all the company may laugh together” (1839b, IX,
13).
Noting cases of communal laughter where no
one is derided, Hutcheson sought to object to
Hobbes on the grounds that we often admire
and sometimes seek to imitate people who amuse
us. Hutcheson points out “laughter often arises
without any imagined superiority of ourselves”
and “laughter in those who may have the highest
veneration . . . and also admire the wit of the person who makes the allusion” (Hutcheson 1750,
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7–8). He then wonders, “what sudden sense of
glory, or joy in our superiority, can arise from observing a quality in another, which we study to
imitate, I cannot imagine” (8). Morreall follows
Hutcheson in interpreting the claim of necessity
into Hobbes’s writing on laughter, arguing that
“the proper way to criticize the Hobbesian theory, I think, is to show that not all cases of laughter involve feelings of superiority, and hence that
the expression of “sudden glory” cannot be the
essence of laughter” (Morreall 1982, 244).
However, insofar as Hobbes allows for nonderisive laughter being evoked by a clever mind
via fancy or wit, the target of Hutcheson’s admiration counterexample evaporates. We find evidence that Hobbes agrees with the admiration
Hutcheson describes for some who are able to
make us laugh when, in the Leviathan, he expresses his admiration for wit and its products:
"All actions, and speeches, that proceed, or seem
to proceed from much experience, science, discretion, or wit, are honorable” (1839a, X, 42).
This suggests not only that Hobbes agrees with
Hutcheson’s case of admiring rather than feeling
superior to an amusing performer or writer, it also
shows that Hobbes does not think superiority is
necessary for laughter. Consider further the admiration he expresses for wit in The Elements of
Law:
That quick ranging of mind . . . which is joined with
curiosity of comparing the things that come into the
mind, one with another: in which comparison a man
delighteth himself either with finding unexpected similitude of things otherwise much unlike (in which men
place the excellency of fancy, and from whence proceed
those grateful similes, metaphors, and other tropes, by
which both poets and orators4 have it in their power to
make things please or displease, and show well or ill to
others, as they like themselves), or else in discerning suddenly dissimilitude in things that otherwise appear the
same. . . . For to judge is nothing else, but to distinguish
or discern: and both fancy and judgment are commonly
comprehended under the name of wit, which seemeth
to be a tenuity and agility of spirits, contrary to that
restiness of the spirits supposed in those that are dull.
(1839b, X, 4)

Wit, for Hobbes, may be a virtue or ability of mind
employed in detecting and expressing superiority,
but there is no textual evidence to believe this
is its only domain. It is more reasonable to read
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Hobbes as referring to the noting of differences
and making of comparisons generally; in other
words, wit is skill and ability in detecting and expressing incongruities. Apprehending incongruity
generally is at the heart of wit for Hobbes: wit
is evidenced in “finding unexpected similitude of
things, otherwise much unlike” and “discerning
suddenly dissimilitude in things that otherwise appear the same.” If so, it is reasonable to question
whether Hobbes really does advance a strict and
essentialist theory of laughter or whether, for him,
comic amusement may sometimes be the result
of apprehending incongruity without any relative
judgments of persons.
Finally, the logic of the oft-quoted passage
on laughter in the Leviathan warrants scrutiny.
Hobbes tells us: “Sudden glory is the passion
which maketh those grimaces called laughter;
and is caused either by some sudden act of their
own, that pleaseth them; or by the apprehension
of some deformed thing in another, by comparison whereof they suddenly applaud themselves”
(1839a, VI). Hobbes’s claim that laughter is caused
by superiority is usually taken to mean that superiority is necessary for laughter. But, of course, a
causal claim like this one has several possible interpretations. “Superiority causes laughter” could
mean that laughter is sufficient for superiority, as
in “weight loss is caused by ingesting fewer calories or increased physical activity.” This claim may
mean that these are the only ways to lose weight,
but that would be an implausible causal claim;
for example, severe illness in the absence of decreased caloric intake or increased physical activity can also be sufficient for weight loss. In other
words, Hobbes’s oft-cited “definition” of laughter
in the Leviathan might merely amount to the claim
that one, but not the only, way to evoke laughter
is through evoking feelings of superiority. If so,
Hobbes is committed to the claim that superiority
can cause laughter and the joy it is often an expression of, but not that it is always (or the only
thing) involved in said joy.
Like Plato and Aristotle before him, Hobbes’s
views on laughter are more nuanced than is often
admitted, and this nuance is missed when the comments are considered independent of their context. Whereas Plato and Aristotle spoke of humor
and laughter largely in terms of ethical considerations, Hobbes spoke of humor and laughter in
terms of his views of human nature and the social
and political arrangements best suited to it. In this
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context, it is not surprising that Hobbes is most
interested in laughter involving superiority and
evidencing our competitive tendencies. However,
as his comments on jest and wit make clear, it is a
mistake to read Hobbes as insisting that laughter
always or only involves the particular satisfaction
felt in one’s perceived superiority.
vi. conclusion: the role of superiority in
humor theory

Despite received wisdom, neither Plato nor
Aristotle nor Hobbes can be said to be superiority
theorists if by that we mean, as per Monro, the
view that “the pleasure we take in humor derives
from our feeling of superiority over those we laugh
at. According to this view, all humor is derisive”
(1988, 350). This is not to say that these philosophers denied that feelings of superiority are sometimes, perhaps even often, involved in laughter. I
have attempted to show that these philosophers
did not hold a superiority theory of laughter, although they each did think of superiority laughter
as an important and common species of laughter.
Indeed, my analysis suggests that Plato and Aristotle were most concerned about, and Hobbes was
most interested in, derisive laughter.
If we take the superiority theory as the view
that superiority is necessary and sufficient, or even
merely either necessary or sufficient, for laughter, it is an implausible theory, a straw-man that,
instead of providing insight into the nature and
value of humor and comic amusement, stands as
an easy target for counterexamples. People often
laugh without any feeling of superiority, and feelings of superiority often fail to evoke laughter. It
does not take much reflection to realize this. It is
strange then that anyone has ever espoused this
theory as a comprehensive theory of the essence
of laugher, let alone philosophers of the caliber of
Plato, Aristotle, and Hobbes. Their thoughts on
humor and laughter are presented in the context
of other discussions, which means that interpreting
their musings about humorous laughter calls for
heightened adherence to the principle of charity.
To my mind, this is not the approach that has been
taken in interpreting these philosophers’ thoughts
on the topic.
Given this, it is also difficult to understand
why anyone ever accepted this interpretation of
Plato, Aristotle, and Hobbes. When and why did
the interpretation of the superiority theory as an
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essentialist theory become received wisdom and
why has this interpretation gone unquestioned for
so long. Here I can merely speculate. Perhaps one
factor is too heavy a reliance on secondary literature. For example, without blaming him, Smuts
traces the “oversimplification” of seeing three
main theories of humor as mutually exclusive to
David Monro:
The standard analysis, developed by D. H. Monro, that
classifies humor theories into superiority, incongruity,
and relief theories sets up a false expectation of genuine
competition between the views. Rarely do any of the
historical theorists in any of these schools state their
theories as listing necessary of sufficient conditions for
something to count as humor, much less put their views
in competition with others. (Smuts 2006)

Moreover, none of the philosophers traditionally
credited with an essentialist superiority theory offered a full treatise on laughter or humor (and we
do not have Aristotle’s if he did) and, in many
cases, this is similarly true in today’s philosophy
of humor. Often theorists come to the topic of
humor with an interest that leads them to focus
on issues and problems other than the nature of
humor per se; therefore, the taxonomy of three
main theories, each essentialist (which is also suspect), is the starting point for, rather than the
object of, inquiry. For example, Ronald de Sousa
(1990) discusses humor and laughter in the context of working out a theory of emotion; Merrie
Bergmann (1986) in attempting to articulate the
nature and harm of sexist humor; Dadlez (2011),
Cynthia Willett (2008), and Cynthia Willett and
Julie Willett (2014) in interrogating subversive humor; Luvell Anderson (2015) in theorizing racist
humor; and Carroll (2014), Bicknell (2007), and
David Benatar (2014) in investigating the ethics of
humor. Like Plato, Aristotle, and Hobbes, many
philosophers interested in humor theory today are
focused on certain aspects of some kinds of humor
less so than on the very nature of humor as such.
As Smuts says,
Rather than clearly offering a superiority theory of humor, Plato and Aristotle focus on this common comic
feature, bringing it to our attention for ethical considerations. . . . However, if we evaluate the weaker version
of the superiority theory—that humor is often fueled
by feelings of superiority—then we have a fairly well
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supported empirical claim, easily confirmable by first
hand observation. (2006).

Given how easily confirmable this empirical claim
is, it is worth asking whether we should continue
to theorize in terms of “the superiority theory” at
all. I believe that, although not as an essentialist
theory, the superiority theory can still play an important role in humor theory. It is obviously, and
perhaps trivially, true that superiority sometimes
plays a key role in some cases of humor and comic
amusement at it. However, it is worth thinking
through different versions of the superiority theory, understood as a theory of some, not all, humor,
whether it is Plato’s concern about how our laughter can express complicity with others’ (and our
own!) self-ignorance, Aristotle’s view that laughter can serve as a social corrective, or Hobbes’s
emphasis on the agonistic aspects laughter can
involve. These different theories, understood correctly, can help us articulate the aesthetic successes
and failures of and related ethical issues raised by
some cases of humor. Not all humor involving superiority is funny, yet some very much is; and not
all humor involving superiority is ethically problematic, yet some very much is. For example, there
is rule among comedians that “punching up” is
generally (always?) permissible whereas “punching down” is generally not (always?). Thinking of
the superiority theory along with considerations
of agents and targets of humor, context, power
relations, and other dynamics and in conjunction
with other theories of humor can help us better
track the aesthetics and the ethics of humor.
Indeed, all of the traditional theories humor—
superiority, relief, and incongruity—are somewhat
accurate and very interesting in their own right;
some comic amusement is enjoying a certain kind
of perceived incongruity that gives one a feeling of superiority reducing psychic and/or bodily energy via expression in laughter. Such a conjoined account explains a great deal about a great
deal of comic amusement. For example, it tells us
what is so enjoyable about the cluelessness of the
character Michael Scott, the regional manager of
a small paper company, played by Steve Carell
in the U.S. version of the NBC television series
The Office (2005–2013). We find Scott’s behavior incongruous with our expectations of professional and even personal life, and we enjoy feeling that we are more self-aware than he appears
to be, which results in an expression of laughter
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releasing some of the stress and tension of our
everyday lives. Admittedly, I would not maintain
that every case of comic amusement would fit this
conjoined characterization. For example, not all
cases of comic amusement involve perceiving incongruity, as for example when I am comically
amused when a well-known stand-up comedian
such as Dave Chappelle responds to a heckler in
a way that is “so him,” “so Chappelle.” Likewise,
not all cases of comic amusement involve feeling
superior, as when I revel in the wisdom and cutting insight the decidedly feminist stand-up comedian Janeane Garofalo shares in her comedy. And
not all cases of comic amusement involve relief,
either psychic or physical, as when I thoroughly
enjoy the intelligent wit delivered by Grammynominated stand-up comedian Steven Wright in
his characteristic deadpan, slow, and monotonous
style, but am not moved to sudden bursts of laughter or anything of the sort by it. Each of the three
mutually consistent theories of humor and comic
amusement help us understand the nature and experience of different cases of comic amusement by
illuminating their cognitive, affective, social, ethical, and psychological aspects.5
SHEILA LINTOTT

Department of Philosophy Bucknell University
Lewisburg, Pennsylvania 17837-2010
internet: sheila.lintott@bucknell.edu

references
Anderson, Luvell. 2015. “Racist Humor.” Philosophy Compass
10: 501–509.
Aristotle. 2002. Nicomachean Ethics. Translated by Joe Sachs.
Newburyport, MA: Focus Philosophical Library.
. 2006. Poetics. Translated by Joe Sachs. Newburyport,
MA: Focus Philosophical Library.
Attardo, Salvatore. 1994. Linguistic Theories of Humor. New
York: Mouton de Gruyter.
Bardon, Adrian. 2005. “The Philosophy of Humor.” In Comedy:
A Geographic and Historical Guide, 2 vols. edited by Maurice
Charney, 462–476. Westport, CT: Praeger.
Benatar, David. 2014. “Taking Humour (Ethics) Seriously, But
Not Too Seriously.” Journal of Practical Ethics 2: 24–43.
Bergmann, Merrie. 1986. “How Many Feminists Does It Take
to Make a Joke? Sexist Humor and What’s Wrong with It.”
Hypatia 1: 63–82.
Bicknell, Jeanette. 2007. “What Is Offensive about Offensive
Jokes?” Philosophy Today 51: 458–465.
Billig, Michael. 2005. Laughter and Ridicule: Towards a Social
Critique of Humour. London: SAGE.
Burnet, John, ed. 1903. Platonis Opera. In Perseus 4.0, Perseus
Digital Library, edited by Gregory R. Crane (Tufts University): http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/.

357
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1. This distinction is drawn in various translations. Joyce
translates the passage in question as follows:
Aristophanes laughed. You are quite right. Eryximachus
he said. I take it all back. But don’t be too hard on me. Not
that I mind if what I’m going to say is funny—all the better
if it is; besides, a comic poet is supposed to be amusing. I’m
only afraid of being utterly absurd. (1960, 189b, emphasis
mine)
Fowler as follows:
At this Aristophanes laughed, and “Quite right,
Eryximachus,” he said; “I unsay all that I have said. Do
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not keep a watch on me for as to what is going to be said,
my fear is not so much of saying something absurd—since
that would be all to the good and native to my Muse—as
something utterly ridiculous.” (1925 189b, emphasis mine)
The original Greek:
Kαὶ τὸν Ἐρυξίμαχον, ὠγαθέ, ϕάναι, Ἀριστόϕανες, ὅρα
τί ποιεῖς. γελωτοποιεῖς μέλλων λέγειν, καὶ ϕύλακά με
τοῦ
λόγου ἀναγκάζεις γίγνεσθαι τοῦ σεαυτοῦ, ἐάν τι γελοῖον
εἴπῃς, ἐξόν σοι ἐν εἰρήνῃ λέγειν.
Kαὶ τὸν Ἀριστοϕάνη γελάσαντα εἰπεῖν Eὖ λέγεις, ὦ
(Burnet 1903)
2. This is certainly the nature of the brilliance of Louis
C.K., whose self-deprecating humor invites us to see ourselves in him and in his failures and foibles.
3. Perhaps this is in part why satirical news shows such
as the Daily Show and the Colbert Report are able to get
so many public figures to appear on their programs, why
2008 U.S. vice-presidential hopeful Sarah Palin happily appeared on the sketch comedy program Saturday Night Live
with Tina Fey whose impersonation of Palin is uncanny,
and Prince, a musician praised for his seriousness, originality, and dedication to his art, featured comedian David
Chappelle (as Prince) in the art for his recent single “Breakfast Can Wait.”
4. Today’s stand-up comedians, I believe, are often orators in this tradition.
5. I would like to thank Jeff Turner and Tom Beasley for
their time and extensive feedback on an early draft of this
article; their insight greatly improved the analysis I offer
here. I am also grateful to Eva Dadlez for her comments
and encouragement. Finally, I thank the two anonymous
reviewers and the two editors of this journal for helpful
suggestions and comments.

